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II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in reversing 
the trial court and concluding, as a matter of law, that 
Petitioners' claim is time-barred because they could and should 
have reasonably discovered, before 1987, that the Respondent had 
failed to protect their security interest; 
2. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in failing 
and refusing to apply the discovery rule to toll the four year 
statute of limitations where Petitioners did not know and should 
not reasonably have known of Respondent's professional negligence 
and misconduct and suffered no damages until a time which was less 
than four years before they filed suit; 
3. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in concluding 
that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous and/or in 
failing to remand this case to the trial court for a determination 
of when Petitioners should have discovered Respondents' 
professional negligence and misconduct; 
4. Whether the issues presented are sufficient to invoke 
this Court's judicial discretion and justify review by writ of 
certiorari under Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
III. REPORTS OF OPINIONS ISSUED BY 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its decision below 
on July 29, 1993. The decision is published at 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 
34 (1993). The opinion has not yet been published in the Pacific 
Reporter. 
IV. JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
A. The Sixth Judicial District Court of Garfield County 
entered judgment on October 18, 1991, and supplemental judgment on 
November 27, 1991. The trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are dated September 26, 1991. The Utah Court of 
Appeals filed its opinion on July 29f 1993. 
B. There has been no Order respecting a rehearing. An 
Order granting an extension of time to file this Petition was 
entered on August 27, 1993. The Order requires that this Petition 
be filed by September 27, 1993. 
C. Inasmuch as this is the original Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, no Cross-Petition has been filed. 
D. The statutory provision which confers jurisdiction 
on the Utah Supreme Court is: U.C.A. Section 78-2-2(3)(a)f 1953, as 
amended. 
V. CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF STATUTES 
The statutes controlling the issues raised in this 
Petition are: 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) . . Statute of Limitations; 
2 
The pertinent provisions of these statutes are attached in Appendix 
A. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for review by writ of certiorari of a 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals reversing a judgment of the 
Sixth Judicial District Court of Garfield County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, in favor of Petitioners and against 
Respondent. Petitioners brought this action against Respondent for 
damages sustained and attorney fees incurred as a result of 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with a real 
estate transaction in Garfield County, Utah. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
1. This action was filed on December 27, 1989. Harold 
Sevy and Winona Sevy (hereinafter "Sevy") claim that Security Title 
Company of Southern Utah (hereinafter "Security Title") was 
negligent and breached its fiduciary duty to them when it failed to 
properly advise them and perfect their security interest in 39 
shares of water stock which they were selling to Kyle and Cindy 
Stewart (hereinafter "Stewart") in Panguitch, Garfield County, 
Utah. (Comp., R. 1-7) 
2. Sevy seeks damages for the cost of defending title to 
said water stock, repurchasing it after his lien was found to be 




3. Security Title denies the allegations of Sevy's 
complaint and affirmatively alleges that Sevy's claims are barred 
by the four year statute of limitations. (Answer, R. 19-25) 
4. On September 26, 1991 , after a bench trial on July 8, 
1991, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. It concluded that Sevy was entitled to judgment against 
Security Title for the amounts prayed, as aforesaid, and for 
attorney fees and cost. (Appendix "B") 
5. On October 18, 1991, Judgment was entered in favor of 
Sevy and against Security Title in the amount of $26,411.76, with 
interest at the rate of 12% per annum until paid. (Appendix "C") 
6. On November 27, 1991f Supplemental Judgment was 
entered in the amount of $4,935.40 for post trial attorney fees and 
costs incurred, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum until 
paid. (Appendix "D") 
7. On July 29, 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed 
the trial court, concluding that Sevy's claim was time-barred 
because he had not met the threshold requirement to toll the 
statute of limitations under the "exceptional circumstances" 
discovery rule and that he could and should have reasonably 
discovered that Security Title had failed to protect his security 
interest more than four years before he filed this action. The 
Utah Court of Appeals vacated the award of damages and attorney 
fees to Sevy and awarded costs to Security Title. (Appendix "E") 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR 
REVIEW 
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1. On April 28, 1991, Sevy sold to Stewart irrigated 
farm land in Garfield County, Utah, with 39 shares of water stock 
in the Long Canal Company, which furnished irrigation water to the 
land. The purchase price was $25,000.00, with a down payment of 
$5,000.00 and annual installments on the unpaid balance. (Appendix 
"B", p. 2; Appendix "E", p. 1) 
2. Sevy and Stewart requested that Security Title 
prepare documents to protect their respective interests in the 
transaction. They asked Security Title to transfer title to the 
land and water stock to Stewart and to provide for a lien in favor 
of Sevy against the land and water stock to secure payment of the 
balance of the purchase price. (Appendix "B", pp. 2, 3; Appendix 
"E", pp. 1, 2) 
3. Security Title prepared: (a) a warranty deed from 
Sevy to Stewart; (b) a note from Stewart to Sevy; (c) a deed of 
trust with assignment of rents against the land and water stock 
from Stewart to Sevy; and (d) an owners title insurance policy for 
Stewart for $25,000.00. (Appendix "B", pp. 3, 5; Appendix "E", p. 
2) 
4. At the closing on April 28, 1991, Security Title 
requested that Sevy deliver to it his water stock certificate 
representing 112 shares of the Long Canal Company. Sevy endorsed 
the certificate and appointed Security Title as agent to transfer 
39 of the 112 shares to Stewart. (Appendix "B", p. 3; Appendix 
"E", p. 2) 
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5. After closing, Security Title recorded the warranty 
deed and trust deed and caused to be transferred to Stewart 39 
shares of the Long Canal Company which issued a new certificate 
numbered 206 representing 39 shares to Stewart and a new 
certificate representing 73 shares to Sevy. (Appendix MB"f pp. 3, 
4; Appendix "E", p. 2) 
6. Security Title delivered the warranty deed to Stewart 
and the trust deed note, deed of trust and 73 shares of the Long 
Canal Company to Sevy. Security Title failed to obtain a receipt 
from the party to whom it delivered certificate numbered 206 
representing the 39 shares sold by Sevy to Stewart. Although there 
was a conflict in the evidence at trial, the trial court found, 
based on the circumstances, that Security Title delivered said 
certificate to Stewart. (Appendix "B", pp. 4, 5; Appendix "E", p. 
2) 
7. Harold Sevy is a farmer, does not have a formal 
education, and relied on Security Title to prepare proper documents 
and secure his first lien against the real property and water 
stock. He had, prior to this transaction, been an officer of The 
Long Canal Company, but had no knowledge regarding how to transfer 
shares and how to perfect security interests therein. Winona Sevy 
did nothing more in this transaction than sign documents as 
requested by her husband, Harold Sevy. (Appendix "B", p. 7) 
8. Security Title decided what documents to prepare and 
the form the transaction would take, prepared the documents, caused 
the warranty deed and deed of trust to be recorded and the water 
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stock to be transferred, did the title work, served as escrow agent 
and as Trustee under the deed of trust, and issued an owners title 
insurance policy to Stewart. (Appendix "B", p. 5) 
9. At the time of the transaction, both Sevy and Stewart 
believed that Sevy was transferring to Stewart the land and water 
stock. Sevy believed that he received a valid first lien against 
the land and water stock transferred to Stewart to secure payment 
of the balance of the purchase price. (Appendix "B", p. 4) 
10. Sevy paid to Security Title the sum of $75.00 for 
its services and the sum of $135.00 as a title insurance premium. 
(Appendix "B", p. 5; Appendix "E", p. 2) 
11. The only step taken by Security Title to provide a 
security interest in Sevy to the water stock was the preparation 
and recording of the deed of trust against the land and the water 
stock. (Appendix "B", p. 8) 
12. On August 21, 1985, Stewart borrowed money from the 
Lockhart Company, pledging the 39 shares of water stock as 
collateral. The Lockhart Company perfected its security interest 
by taking possession of the 39 share certificate and through filing 
a financing statement with the State of Utah on September 3, 1985. 
On March 31, 1986, Stewart borrowed additional sums from The 
Lockhart Company. On October 2, 1986, the Lockhart Company 
assigned its rights against Stewart to Associates Financial 
Services of Utah, Inc., (hereinafter "Associates"). (Appendix "B", 
pp. 7, 8; Appendix "E", p. 3) 
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13. In 1986, Stewart defaulted on his payments to Sevy 
and Sevy repossessed the farm land. Thereafter Stewart filed a 
petition in bankruptcy. (Appendix "B", p. 8; Appendix "E", p. 3) 
14. On April 15, 1987, Associates filed suit in the 
Fifth District Court of Iron County against Sevy and Security Title 
to establish the priority of its security interest in the water 
stock. Sevy defended said action on the merits. Security Title 
neither made an appearance nor otherwise defended. (Appendix "B", 
pp. 8, 9; Appendix "E", p. 3) 
15. On November 2, 1987f said court entered summary 
judgment declaring that Associates had a valid first lien and 
perfected security interest in and to said water stock, free of any 
claim on the part of Sevy and Security Title. (Appendix "B", pp. 9, 
10; Appendix "E", p. 3; Summary Judgment, Appendix "F") 
16. On June 21
 f 1989 f the Utah Court of Appeals, 
affirmed the summary judgment of the Fifth District Court. 
(Appendix "B", p. 10; opinion of Court of Appeals, Appendix "G") 
17. On August 31, 1989, Sevy purchased the water stock 
from Associates for the sum of $7,250.00 in order to preserve the 
entire security described in the deed of trust. (Appendix "B", p. 
11; Appendix "E", p. 3) 
18. Sevy filed the lawsuit from which this petition 
arises on December 27, 1989, alleging that Security Title was 
professionally negligent and breached its fiduciary duty to Sevy in 
failing to perfect his security interest in the water stock. 
Security Title moved for summary judgment on the ground that Sevy's 
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claim was barred by the four year statute of limitations. The 
trial court denied the motion. (Appendix "E", p. 3; Complaint, R. 
1-7) 
19. On September 26, 1991, after a bench trial on July 
8, 1991, at which both lay and expert witnesses were called and 
testified, the trial court found: 
(a) The general public relies on title insurance 
companies to properly prepare documents and conduct real estate 
transactions and closings and further relies on what title 
companies say with respect to real estate transactions; (Appendix 
"B", p. 5) 
(b) The custom and practice in the title insurance 
industry, in 1981 and at the time of trial, where the sale involves 
water stock in an irrigation company with a security interest in 
favor of the seller, was that the title company do one of the 
following: delay transferring the stock on the books of the 
corporation until the final payment on the purchase price is made 
to seller; make the transfer on the books of the corporation and 
hold the new certificate in escrow until the final payment is made; 
transfer the stock on the books of the corporation and deliver the 
new certificate to the seller with instructions that seller retain 
possession of the certificate until final payment is made; or 
advise seller to seek legal counsel. A failure of the title 
company to take at least one of the foregoing steps would 
constitute a breach of its duty to the seller; (Appendix "B", p. 6) 
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(c) Sevy relied on Security Title to protect him by 
providing a valid first lien in his favor against the real property 
and water stock being sold and transferred to Stewart; (Id.) 
(d) Security Title breached its duty to Sevy by 
failing to take any one of the steps described in sub-paragraph (b) 
of this paragraph 19. (Appendix "B"f pp. 6, 7) 
(e) The first knowledge Sevy had that Stewart had 
given a lien against the water stock was when Sevy was sued by 
Associates in 1987. (Appendix "B", p. 9; Tr., pp. 45, 46) 
(f) Sevy was justified, under the deed of trust, in 
taking action he thought necessary to defend the action filed by 
Associates and in prosecuting said appeal in order to preserve the 
security; (Appendix "B", p. 10) 
(g) The attorney fees and costs, in the amount of 
$10,250.00, incurred by Sevy in defending the action of Associates 
and in prosecuting the appeal from the judgment of the Fifth 
District Court, were reasonable and were necessarily incurred in 
Sevy's attempts to preserve the security under the deed of trust. 
(Appendix "B", p. 12) 
(h) The amount expended by Sevy in purchasing the 
water stock from Associates ($7,250.00) was reasonable and was 
necessarily incurred in preserving the security under the deed of 
trust. (Id.) 
(i) Security Title's defense of this action, under 
all the circumstances, was without merit and was not asserted in 
good faith; (Id.) 
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(j) Security Title's representation to Sevy, which 
is implicit in what was said and done by the parties hereto and by 
Stewart, that it was qualified to prepare the documents and 
orchestrate the transaction, was deceptive under the Utah Consumer 
Protection Act which applies to this case; (Id,) 
(k) A reasonable attorney fee to be awarded to Sevy 
in prosecuting this action is $5,000.00, plus reasonable fees 
incurred subsequent to the time of trial. (Appendix "B", pp. 12, 
13) 
20. The trial court made this oral finding: 
I find against the Defendant on the Statute 
of Limitation . . . . The Court makes a 
finding that the Statute of Limitations would 
commence as of the time of the discovery, 
which was the filing of the [Associates 
Financial] lawsuit. 
(Appendix "E", p. 8; Tr., p. 249) 
21. Security Title never told Sevy that the water stock 
should not be transferred until he was paid in full, that Stewart 
should not have possession of the new water certificate until he 
paid Sevy in full, that Sevy should hold the water stock in his 
possession, or that he should seek legal counsel. Moreover, 
Security Title told Sevy that he should have the trust deed and the 
trust deed note in order to protect him and that "they'd take care 
of the whole works." (Tr., pp. 44, 45) 
22. On October 18, 1991, Judgment was entered in favor 
of Sevy and against Security Title in the amount of $26,411.76, 
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from entry of judgment 
until paid. (Appendix "C") 
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23. On November 27, 1991, Supplemental Judgment in the 
amount of $4,935.40 was entered for post trial attorney fees and 
for Sevy's costs, plus interest. (Appendix "D") 
24. On July 29f 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed 
the trial court, concluding: that Sevy had not met the threshold 
requirement to toll the statute of limitations under the 
"exceptional circumstances" discovery rule; that Sevy could and 
should have reasonably discovered that Security Title had failed to 
protect his security interest before 1987; and that Sevy's action 
was time-barred. The Utah Court of Appeals further vacated the 
award of damages and attorney fees to Sevy and awarded costs to 
Security Title. (Appendix "E") 
ARGUMENT 
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW NOS. 1 AND 2. WHETHER THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT AND CONCLUDING, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS TIME-BARRD BECAUSE 
THEY COULD AND SHOULD HAVE REASONABLY DISCOVERED, BEFORE 1987, THAT 
THE RESPONDENT HAD FAILED TO PROTECT THEIR SECURITY INTEREST; AND 
WHEHTER THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO 
APPLY THE DISCOVERY RULE TO TOLL THE FOUR YEAR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS WHERE PETITIONERS DID NOT KNOW AND SHOULD NOT 
REASONABLY HAVE KNOWN OF RESPONDENT'S PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE AND 
MISCONDUCT AND SUFFERED NO DAMAGES UNTIL A TIME WHICH WAS LESS THAN 
FOUR YEARS BEFORE THEY FILED SUIT. 
Point No. 1. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals is 
Inconsistent with Prior Decisions of Both the Utah Supreme Court 
and Another Panel of the Court of Appeals. 
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have 
issued decisions which cannot be reconciled with the Appeals Court 
ruling in this action. Inasmuch as the ruling below is in conflict 
with other rulings of this Court and the Court of Appeals, a Writ 
of Certiorari should be granted. 
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In Klinaer v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990) this 
Court held that sellers of real property could not reasonably have 
discovered a surveyor's negligence until the surveyor's error was 
brought to sellers' attention nearly fourteen (14) years after the 
survey was conducted. Despite the prejudice to the surveyor in the 
adoption of the discovery rule (the Court acknowledged that the 
surveyor had no survey records or notes, and that presumably the 
memories of the survey party had dimmed after 14 years), this Court 
found that the sellers "had no reason to suspect that the survey 
was inaccurate, nor did they refrain from doing anything that might 
reasonably have been expected of them that could have disclosed the 
error." 791 P.2d at 872. Under these facts the Court held that 
"the evidence [was] not so stale or remote as to outweigh the 
prejudice to defendants of having their claim barred by the statute 
of limitation. The discovery rule should be applied to the statute 
of limitation for surveyor negligence under Utah Code Ann. Section 
78-12-25(2) ." Id^ . 
In Merklev v. Beaslin, 778 P.2d 16 (Utah App. 1989) the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant attorney had negligently 
failed to advise the plaintiffs that a UCC-1 security interest in 
personal property must be renewed every five years in order to 
retain its efficacy. The plaintiffs alleged that they had lost 
their priority security interest in personal property when their 
buyers filed a petition in bankruptcy seven years after the initial 
UCC-1 filing. In Merklev, the critical issue was the date the 
alleged malpractice action accrued. In holding that the discovery 
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rule applies to a legal malpractice case, the Merkley panel of the 
Court of Appeals noted that "the attorney-client relationship is 
based upon trust, and is a situation in which one less 
knowledgeable must rely on another, who has special expertise, for 
advice and assistance." 778 P.2d at 19. The court also noted 
that the nature of the relationship "is such that, often, attorney 
negligence would not be discovered until years after the act had 
occurred ..." Id. See also Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1314 
(Utah 1990) (Applying the discovery rule to defamation cases, and 
acknowledging that "[u]nlike cases involving direct injury to the 
person, a libel may remain undiscovered for years, all the while 
having its effect on one's reputation."). 
The rationale advanced by this Court in Klinqer and the 
Court of Appeals in Merkley have direct application to the claims 
asserted by Sevy against the Respondent, and neither case can 
reasonably be distinguished from the facts presented to the Appeals 
Court below. In each case the injured party placed its trust and 
reliance in another with special knowledge, skills and abilities 
not possessed by the injured party. In each case the misconduct or 
negligence was not discovered until a considerable period of time 
after the misconduct occurred. In each case the very nature of the 
transaction was such that the misconduct was not discovered until 
years after the misconduct occurred. In each case the damage to 
the parties did not accrue until some other event occurred, e.g., 
the sale of the property (Klinqer), the bankruptcy filing of a 
purchaser (Merkley), or the hypothecation of the water stock 
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certificate (Sevy). In Klinger as in this actionf important facts, 
information and documents were lost or unavailable if for no other 
reason than the passage of time. Finally, the problems of proof 
are no more onerous for one party than the other. See Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah 1981). 
Sevy submits that the decision of the Court of Appeals is in 
direct conflict with the decision of this Court in Klinqer and that 
of the Appeals Court in Merkley. As a result, the Court of Appeals 
erred in concluding that Sevy could and should have discovered 
Respondent's misconduct, and further erred in its refusal to apply 
the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations in this 
action. As a result, the burden of discovery placed on Sevy by the 
Utah Court of Appeals is in conflict with a prior decision of this 
court, and requires a review of this decision, by this Court. 
Point No. 2. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is a 
Departure from the Ordinary and Usual Course of Judicial 
Proceedings. 
A. The Appeals Court Failed to Distinguish the Facts 
of This Case From Those Presented in Klinqer and 
Merkley. 
The Utah Court of Appeals made no attempt to distinguish 
either Klinger or Merkley from the issues presented below. Sevy 
submits that the Appeals Court's failure to address these 
distinctions constitutes a departure from the usual course of 
judicial proceedings, and requires a review and reversal by this 
Court. In cases where Utah's appellate courts have held that the 
discovery rule should not apply, the injured parties uniformly had 
knowledge of the other's misconduct. In Warren v. Provo City 
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Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992), this Court found that the 
airplane crash (the cause of plaintiff's injuries) gave plaintiff 
reasonable grounds to question whether the defendant was enforcing 
its ordinance on airplane safety and insurance. In addition, the 
evidence indicated that prior to the expiration of the bar date, 
plaintiff's counsel had made a series of unanswered inquiries 
relating to defendant's compliance with its ordinance. In Atwood 
v. Sturm, Ruger and Co., Inc., 823 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1992) the 
Plaintiff was aware of his injuries, damages and a possible cause 
of action several months before the four year limitations period 
passed. In O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139 
(Utah 1991), the Plaintiff was aware of and had vivid memories of 
the abuse giving rise to his claim. In Briqham Young University v. 
Paulsen Construction Co., 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987), the plaintiff 
knew of its cause of action against the defendant three and a half 
years before the limitation period expired. Finally, in Jackson v. 
Lavton City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1987) the plaintiffs filed a 
timely notice of claim against the city under the governmental 
immunity act, the alleged defect complained of was patent, and 
plaintiff was aware of the injury four years and six months before 
filing her complaint. 
As indicated in the trial court's finding of fact no. 25, 
Sevy's first knowledge of Respondent's misconduct was on the day he 
was sued by Associated. The facts relating to Sevy's claim against 
the Respondent are grossly different from any of the cases where 
this Court has found that the discovery rule should not apply. 
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Sevy was unaware of Respondent's misconduct and negligence until 
well after the four year limitation period had passed. Under the 
holdings of this Court and, with the exception of the ruling below, 
the holdings of the Utah Court of Appeals, the discovery rule 
should be applied to toll the statute of limitations until the date 
that Sevy became aware of Respondent's misconduct. 
B. The Appeals Court Ignored the Klinqer Rationale of 
Why the Discovery Rule Should be Extended to Land 
Transaction Cases. 
In its opinion below the Utah Court of Appeals goes to 
great efforts to conclude that Sevy could and should have 
discovered that the Respondent had failed to protect Sevy's 
security interest. 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36-37. The considerable 
burden cast on Sevy by the Appeals Court was clearly considered and 
rejected by this Court in Klinqer. 791 P.2d at 871. The arguments 
and rationale articulated in Klinqer in favor of applying the 
discovery rule apply equally to this action: an innocent user of 
title company services should not carry the burden of the title 
company's mistakes; recovery by a reliant user of title company 
services will promote cautionary practices among title companies; 
the passage of time does not entail a danger that false and 
speculative claims will be asserted, nor does it appear that the 
parties' testimonial proof will be made more difficult; it is 
illogical to require the user of title company services to hire two 
or three others to assure that the action taken by the first was 
accurate; strict application of the statute of limitation would be 
unjust; and the user of title company lacks the means or ability to 
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ascertain that a wrong has been committed. Id. There is no 
sound, just or equitable reason why the policy considerations 
adopted by this Court in Klinger should not apply to this case, and 
the failure of the Appeals Court to address these rationale and 
apply them to the facts of this case is a departure from the usual 
and accepted course of judicial proceedings which merits a review 
by this Court. 
QUESTION FOR REVIEW NO. 3. WHETHER THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WERE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND/OR IN FAILING TO REMAND THIS CASE TO THE 
TRIAL COURT FOR A DETERMINATION OF WHEN PETITIONERS SHOULD HAVE 
DISCOVERED RESPONDENT'S PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE AND MISCONDUCT. 
The Appeals Court's assessment of when Sevy could have 
and should have known of Respondent's misconduct is predicated on 
the rule that "[wjhether the discovery rule applies to toll the 
statute of limitations is a question of law, thus we show no 
deference to the trial court's ruling on appeal, but review it for 
correctness.'" Sevy v. Security Title Co., 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 
35 (Utah App. 1993); citing Klinger v. Rightlv, 791 P.2d 868, 870 
(Utah 1990). Sevy submits that the Court of Appeals erred in its 
assessment of the factual basis for its ruling. Specifically, by 
ruling that any finding of the trial court that Sevy could not have 
known of Respondent's misconduct until Sevy was sued in 1987, the 
Court of Appeals improperly usurped the function of the trial court 
as the finder of fact. This departure from the ordinary course of 
judicial proceedings also merits a review by this Court. 
The issue of when a plaintiff knew or should have known 
of his claim against a defendant is a question of fact to be 
18 
determined by the trier of fact. Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P.2d 
435, 437 (Utah 1968); Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1314 (Utah 
App. 1990). In complete disregard of this rule, the Appeals Court 
substituted its opinion for that of the trial court, and completely 
disregarded the function of the trial court to weigh the evidence 
and the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony. 
Sevy submits that there is ample support in the Court's 
findings for a ruling that the earliest date Sevy knew or could or 
should have known of the Respondent's negligence was in April 1987 
when it was sued by Associates. In finding no. 25, the trial court 
found that "[t]he first knowledge that Sevy had that Stewart had 
given a lien against said certificate was when Sevy was sued by 
Associates, as aforesaid" in April 1987. In other findings the 
trial court found that Sevy believed he had a good and valid lien 
against the water stock (Finding no. 10); that the public relies on 
title companies to properly prepare documents, conduct 
transactions, and that the public relies on what it is told by 
title companies (Finding no. 17); that Sevy had no formal 
education, had no knowledge of how to perfect a security interest 
in water stock and in fact relied on Respondent to protect him and 
secure his first lien on the water stock (Findings no. 19 and 22). 
These findings support, both directly and by inference, the 
proposition that Sevy neither knew nor should have known of 
Respondent's negligence and misconduct prior to April 1987. 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the trial 
court's findings are not "crystal clear," 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36, 
19 
under the rule described above, the Court of Appeals should have 
remanded the issue to the trial court for further consideration. 
See, e.g., Klinger, Allen, Myers, and Christiansen, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
As described in detail above, the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals should be reviewed by this Court. The ruling 
below conflicts with prior decisions of both the Utah Supreme Court 
and decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals on the application of 
the discovery rule. The ruling of the Court of Appeals is a 
radical departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings not only in its disregard of the law on the discovery 
rule, but also in its usurpation of the fact finding function of 
the trial court. Finally, each of the questions raised above 
present important questions of law that should be decided by the 
Utah Supreme Court. For these special and important reasons, the 
Petitioners request that the Court grant their Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari and review the ruling below of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ ?7>&day of September, 1993. 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON AND GOTTFREDSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Appellees and 
Mark Fitzgerald Bell, Esq. 
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APPENDIX A 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated Sect ion 78-12-1 provides: 
78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this 
chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a 
different limitation is prescribed by statute. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-25 provides: 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon 
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and 
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an 
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at 
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received. 
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of 
Title 25, Chapter 6, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the 
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1). 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
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SECURITY TITLE COMPANY 
OF SOUTHERN UTAH, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 3375 
This matter came on regularly for trial before th» 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge of the above-entitled Court, sittin< 
without a jury, on the 8th day of July, 1991, at the Garfield Count] 
Courthouse in Panguitch, UtahT~-Plaintif fs were present in Court am 
represented by their attorney, Robert F. Orton of the firm o 
Marsden, Orton, Cahoon & Gottfredson. Defendant appeared throug 
its President, Dan A. Robison, and was represented by its attorney 
J. Bryan Jackson. And the Plaintiffs, having called witnesses t 
testify on their behalf, having offered exhibits and having rested 

























having offered exhibits and having rested; and the Court, having 
heard argument of counsel and having thereafter made certain 
Findings of Fact from the bench; and the Court, being fully advised 
in the premises and good cause appearing, now makes and enters the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On the 28th day April, 1981, Plaintiffs, Harold Sevy 
and Winona Sevy (hereinafter "Sevy"), sold to Kyle R. Stewart and 
Cindy M. Stewart (hereinafter "Stewart") approximately 12.86 acres 
of irrigated farm land located in Garfield County, State of Utah, 
together with 28 shares of primary and 11 shares of secondary water 
stock in The Long Canal Company. 
2. The agreed purchase price for said land and water 
stock was $25,000.00, with a down payment of $5,000.00 and the 
balance payable in annual installments with interest at the rate of 
10% per annum on the unpaid balance. 
3. Sevy and Stewart went to Defendant, Security T^tle 
Company of Southern Utah (hereinafter "Security Title"), to have 
proper documents prepared and to be protected in the transaction. 
4. It was the intent of Sevy and Stewart that Sevy 
transfer title to said land and water stock to Stewart and that 
Stewart give to Sevy a lien against said land and water stock to 

























5. The intention of Sevy and Stewart, as set forth in 
paragraph numbered 4 of these Findings of Fact, was stated to 
Security Title before it prepared documents of sale, transfer and 
security. 
6. Security Title prepared a Warranty Deed from Sevy to 
Stewart, a Note Secured by Deed of Trust in the principal amount of 
$20,000.00 from Stewart to Sevy, and a Deed of Trust With Assignment 
of Rents against said land and water stock from Stewart to Sevy to 
secure payment of said principal amount, interest and all other 
amounts described in said Note and Deed of Trust. 
7. At the closing of said transaction on April 28, 1981, 
at the offices of Security Title in Fanguitch, Utah, Sevy was 
requested by Security Title to obtain his water stock certificate, 
whereupon Mr. Sevy obtained from his bank deposit box and delivered 
to Security Title stock certificate numbered 200 representing 112 
76/100 shares of The Long Canal Company. Sevy endorsed said stock 
certificate, in the presence of Russell M. Dalton, agent for 
Security Title, and appointed Security Title as agent to transfer 
39 shares of said water stock to Stewart on the books of The Long 
Canal Company. 
8. Following said closing, Security Title caused to be 
recorded at the Garfield County Recorders Office said Warranty Deed 
and Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents and to be transferred on 

























thereof to Stewart. The Long Canal Company issued a new certificate 
numbered 206, representing 28 shares of primary and 11 shares of 
secondary water stock, to Stewart. 
9. Thereafter, said Warranty Deed and certificate 
numbered 206 and copies of said Trust Deed Note and Deed of Trust 
With Assignment of Rents were delivered to Stewart and said Trust 
Deed Note and Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents, together with 
a new certificate representing 73 76/100 shares of The Long Canal 
Company were delivered to Sevy. 
10. Both Sevy and Stewart believed that Sevy was 
transferring to Stewart said land and 39 shares of water stock at 
the time of the transaction and Sevy believed that he had a good and 
valid first lien against said land and 39 shares of water stock 
transferred to Stewart to secure payment of the balance of the 
purchase price. 
11. After the recording of said Warranty Deed and Deed 
of Trust With Assignment of Rents and the transfer of said water 
stock on the books of The Long Canal Company, Security Title 
delivered all of the documents which it had prepared, together with 
certificate numbered 206 representing 39 shares of water stock in 
The Long Canal Company which had been issued to Stewart and the 
title insurance policy hereinafter described, to Sevy and Stewart. 
12. Security Title failed to obtain a receipt from the 
party to whom it delivered the new water stock certificate numbered 
I 
206 and no instructions were given by either Sevy or Stewart to 
Security Title with respect to whom it should deliver said 
certificate. 
13. Although there is a conflict in the evidence as to 
whom Security Title delivered said stock certificate numbered 206, 
the Court finds, by the greater weight of the evidence, that 
Security Title delivered said certificate to Stewart. 
14. Security Title made the decision as to what documents 
would be prepared and the form the transaction would take, prepared 
all of said documents, caused said Warranty Deed and Deed of Trust 
With Assignment of Rents to be recorded and said water stock to be 
transferred, did all of the title work, served as escrow agent and 
as Trustee under said Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents, and 
issued an owners title insurance policy to Stewart. 
15. The title insurance policy which was issued by 
Security Title to Stewart was for the amount of $25,000.00, the full 
amount of the purchase price, notwithstanding the fact that it 
covered only the land and did not include said water stock. 
16. Sevy paid to Security Title the sum of $75.00 for its 
services and the sum of $135.00 as a title insurance premium on the 
$25,000.00 title insurance policy issued to Stewart, as aforesaid. 
17. Members of the general public rely generally on title 

























estate transactions and closings and further rely on what they ar< 
told by title companies with respect to real estate transactions. 
18. The custom and practice in the title insurance 
industry, in 1981 and at present, where the sale involves water 
stock in an irrigation company with a security interest in favor of 
the seller, is that the title insurance company do one of the 
following: delay transferring the stock on the books of the 
corporation until the final payment on the purchase price is made 
to seller; make the transfer on the books of the corporation and 
hold the new certificate in escrow until the final payment is made; 
transfer the stock on the books of the corporation and deliver the 
new certificate to the seller with instructions that seller retain 
possession of said certificate until final payment is made; or 
advise seller to seek legal counsel. A failure of the title 
insurance company to take at least one of the foregoing steps would 
constitute a breach of its duty to the seller. 
19. Sevy relied on Security Title to protect him by 
providing in said transaction a good and valid first lien in his 
favor against the real property and shares of water stock being sold 
and transferred to Stewart. 
20. Security Title, in this case, breached its duty to 
Sevy by failing to take at least one of the following steps: delay 
transferring Sevy's water stock to Stewart on the books of The Long 
Canal Company until final payment on the purchase price was made; 
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hold the new certificate in escrow after the transfer on the books 
of the corporation, until final payment was made; deliver the new 
certificate to Sevy with instructions that he retain possession of 
it until final payment on the purchase price was made; and advise 
Sevy that he should seek the advice of legal counsel. 
21. The preparation of the documents in connection with 
the real estate transaction between Sevy and Stewart did not 
necessarily mean that Security Title was accepting the 
responsibility as a trustee. 
22. Plaintiff, Harold Sevy, is a farmer, does not have 
a formal education, and relied on Security Title to prepare proper 
documents and secure his first lien against the real property and 
water stock. Said Plaintiff had, prior to said transaction, been 
an officer of The Long Canal Company, but had no knowledge regarding 
how to transfer shares and how to perfect security interests 
therein. 
23. Plaintiff, Winona Sevy, did nothing more in this 
transaction than sign documents as requested by her husband, Harold 
Sevy. 
24. Said new certificate numbered 206 made its way to 
Stewart, as aforesaid, and on or about the 21st day of August, 1985, 
and the 31st day of March, 1986, Stewart borrowed money from The 
Lockhart Company and secured his loans by delivering said 

























interest through a UCC-1 filing with the Utah State Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code on September 3, 1985, as Filing No. 
033326, and by retaining possession of said certificate numbered 
206. 
25. The only step taken by Security Title to provide a 
security interest in Sevy to said water stock was the preparation 
and recording of said Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents. 
26. Stewart defaulted on its obligations to The Lockhart 
Company and on or about October 2, 1986, The Lockhart Company 
assigned to Associates Financial Services of Utah, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Associates"), all of its rights against Stewart and delivered to 
Associates share certificate numbered 206, representing said 39 
shares of stock in The Long Canal Company. 
27. Thereafter, Stewart filed a Petition in Bankruptcy 
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah and 
bankruptcy trustee Kenneth Rushton abandoned his interest and the 
interest of Stewart in and to said 39 shares of capital stock in The 
Long Canal Company. 
28. On or about April 15, 1987, Associates filed suit 
against Sevy and Security Title in the Fifth Judicial District Court 
of Iron County, State of Utah, seeking a declaration that it was the 
holder of a good, valid and sufficient perfected security interest 
in and to share certificate 206, including 39 shares of the capital 
stock of The Long Canal Company, free and clear of any right, title, 
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claim, lien or security interest on the part of Sevy and Security 
Title, seeking a decree that it be permitted to foreclose its 
security interest as provided by law without further claim or 
interference by Sevy and Security Title, and seeking an injunction 
against Sevy and Security Title from asserting any claim to said 
water stock in derogation of Associates' interest or rights. 
29. The first knowledge Sevy had that Stewart had given 
a lien against said certificate numbered 206 in favor of a lending 
institution was when Sevy was sued by Associates, as aforesaid. 
30. Sevy defended said action by Associates; however, 
Security Title neither made an appearance nor otherwise defended 
said action. 
31. On or about the 2nd day of November, 1987, the Fifth 
Judicial District Court of Iron County, State of Utah, entered 
summary judgment as follows: 
(a) Entering the default of Security Title; 
(b) Adjudging and decreeing that Associates is the 
holder of a good, valid and sufficient perfected security interest 
in and to share certificate numbered 206 covering 39 shares of the 
capital stock of The Long Canal Company, free and clear of any 
adverse right, title, claim, lien or security interest on the part 

























(c) Giving Associates leave to foreclose its said 
security interest as provided by law without further claim or 
interference by Sevy and Security Title; 
(d) Permanently enjoining and restraining Sevy and 
Security Title from asserting any claim to The Long Canal Company 
share certificate numbered 206 and the water rights represented 
thereby in derogation of or adverse to Associates' perfected 
security interest in the same and from any interference with 
Associates' foreclosure of said security interest. 
32. On the 21st day of June, 1989, the Utah Court of 
Appeals, in an appeal prosecuted by Sevy, affirmed the judgment of 
the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, State of Utah, 
holding that the security interest of Associates in said water stock 
is prior to the unperfected security interest of Sevy and that 
Associates may foreclose. 
33. Sevy was justified, under paragraph 4 of the Deed of 
Trust With Assignment of Rents, in taking action he thought 
necessary in defending the action filed by Associates and in 
prosecuting said appeal in order to preserve the security; moreover, 
the action taken by Sevy in so doing was reasonable. 
34. Stewart defaulted on its obligation to Sevy arising 
out of the sale of said real property and water stock after making 
the annual payments for the years 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985, and 
Sevy, under his contract with Stewart, took possession of said real 
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property, but lost all of his right, title and interest in and to 
said certificate numbered 206 and the 39 shares of stock in The Long 
Canal Company. 
35. On the 31st day of August, 1989, Sevy purchased said 
water stock from Associates for the sum of $7,250.00 in order to 
preserve the entire security described in said Deed of Trust With 
Assignment of Rents. 
36. The balance owing on the indebtedness of Stewart to 
Sevy is $49,485.00 calculated as follows, with interest to July 1, 
1991, to-wit: 
Nature of Amount Owing Principal Interest Total 
Balance on Note $14,215.00 $8,173.00 $22,388.00 
Taxes 100.00 57.00 157.00 
Redemption of Water Stock 7,250.00 1,390.00 8,640.00 
Costs of Associates 
Litigation 10,250.00 2,050.00 12,300.00 
Cost of Foreclosure 
Action 6.000.00 0.00 6.000.00 
TOTALS $37.815.00 $11.670.00 $49.485.00 
37. Because of Stewart's bankruptcy, Sevy shall be 
entitled to no deficiency against Stewart in the action to foreclose 
under said Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents. 
38. At the time of said real estate transaction between 
Sevy and Stewart, at the present time, and at all times between said 
two dates, said water stock had a fair market value of $400.00 per 
share on the primary stock and no value on the secondary stock for 

























farm land sold by Sevy to Stewart, with said water stock included, 
is $14,850.00. 
39. The attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Sevy in 
defending the action of Associates and in prosecuting the appeal 
from the judgment of the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron 
County, State of Utah, as aforesaid, to-wit: the sum of $10,250.00, 
were reasonable and were necessarily incurred in Sevy's attempts to 
preserve the security under said Deed of Trust With Assignment of 
Rents. 
40. The amount expended by Sevy in purchasing said water 
stock from Associates, to-wit: the sum of $7,250.00, was reasonable 
and was necessarily incurred in preserving the security under said 
Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents. 
41. Security Title's defense of this action, under all 
the circumstances, is without merit and is not asserted in good 
faith. 
42. Security Title's representation to Sevy, which is 
implicit in what was said and done by the parties hereto and by 
Stewart, that it was qualified to prepare the documents and 
orchestrate the transaction, as aforesaid, was deceptive under the 
Utah Consumer Protection Act which applies to this case. 
43. A reasonable attorneys' fee to be awarded to Sevy in 
prosecuting this action is $5,000.00, together with such additional 
fees as appear to the Court to be reasonable for services rendered 
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by Sevy's counsel subsequent to the time of trial. Any such 
additional fees shall be determined by the Court on the basis of 
affidavits to be filed as follows: Sevy shall file and serve his 
affidavit within ten days after entry of judgment herein and 
Security Title shall file and serve its affidavit within ten days 
after service of Sevy's affidavit. If the Court finds that any such 
additional fees should be awarded, a supplemental judgment shall be 
entered for the amount thereof. 
To the extent that any of the foregoing Findings of Fact 
are more appropriately Conclusions of Law, they shall be deemed to 
be such. 
On the foregoing Findings of Factf the Court concludes: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs, Harold Sevy and Winona Sevy, are entitled to 
judgment against Defendant, Security Title Company of Southern Utah, 
as follows: 
1. Denying Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment on the 
grounds that on the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and all 
of the evidence herein, Defendant is not entitled to summary 
judgment because Plaintiffs' claims are not barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations, the statute of frauds or the one action 
rule. 
2. Adjudging and decreeing that Defendant is entitled to 
no award of attorney's fees. 
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3. For the following amounts: 
(a) The sum of $10,250.00, together with interest thereon at 
the rate of ten per cent per annum from the 21st day of June, 1989, to date 
of entry of judgment herein; 
(b) The sum of $7,250.00, together with interest thereon at 
the rate of ten per cent per annum from the 31st day of August, 1989, to 
date of entry.of judgement herein; 
(c) For the sum of $5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees in 
prosecuting this action. 
(d) For supplemental judgment for attorneys1 fees, in a 
reasonable amount, incurred by Plaintiffs herein since the time of trial 
as provided in paragraph numbered 43 of the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
(e) For interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum 
on the maounts of said judgment and supplemental judgment from the dates 
of entry thereof until paid, together with Plaintiffs' costs of suit 
herein incurred. 
To the extent that any of the foregoing Conclusions of Law shall 
more appropriately be Findings of Fact-they shall be deemed to be such. 
Mr. Robert F. Orton, Attorney for the Plaintiffs, to prepare 
the Decree. 
Dated thisAfe^^Sty^^f September, 1991 
i 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
On the^K / day of September, 1991, I mailed a copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in case No. 3375, to 
< 
the following, postage prepaid, from offices at Manti, Utah: 
J. Bryan Jackson, Attorney for Defendant 
111 North Main, P.O. Box 519, Cedar City, Utah, 84720 
Robert F. Orton, Attorney for Plaintiff 
68 South Main Street, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101 
APPENDIX C 
JUDGMENT 
OCT 2 3 1991. 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY i 
STATE OF UTAH 




SECURITY TITLE COMPANY 
OF SOUTHERN UTAH, 
Defendant. 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. 3375 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge of the above-entitled Court, sitting 
without a jury, on the 8th day of July, 1991, at the Garfield County 
Courthouse in Panguitch, Utah. Plaintiffs were present in Court and 
represented by their attorney, Robert F. Orton of the firm of 
Marsden, Orton, Cahoon & Gottfredson. Defendant appeared through 
its President, Dan A. Robison, and was represented by its attorney, 
J. Bryan Jackson. And the Plaintiffs, having called witnesses to 
testify on their behalf, having offered exhibits and having rested; 
and the Defendant, having called witnesses to testify on its behalf, 
having offered exhibits and having rested; and the Court, having 
heard argument of counsel and having thereafter made limited 
Findings of Fact from the bench; and the Court being fully advised 
in the premises and having, on the 26th day of September, 1991, 
executed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and said Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law having been entered hereon on the 
30th day of September, 1991; and good cause appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
1. That Plaintiffs, Harold Sevy and Winona Sevy, be and 
they are hereby awarded judgment in their favor and against 
Defendant, Security Title Company of Southern Utah, in the sum and 
amount of TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED ELEVEN DOLLARS AND 
SEVENTY-SIX CENTS ($26,411.76), which includes interest as provided 
in said Conclusions of Law computed to October 15, 1991, together 
with interest on said sum and amount at the rate of twelve per cent 
(12%) per annum from the date of entry of this Judgment until paid 
and Plaintiffs' taxable costs herein incurred. 
2. Plaintiffs shall be entitled to a Supplemental 
Judgment against Defendant for attorney's fees appearing to the 
Court to be reasonable for services rendered to Plaintiffs since the 
time of trial. Such additional fees shall be determined by the 
Court on the basis of affidavits to be filed and served as follows: 
Plaintiffs shall file and serve their Affidavit within ten (10) days 
after entry of this Judgment and Defendant shall file and serve its 
Affidavit within ten (10) days after service of Plaintiffs' 
Affidavit. The amount which the Court finds, based upon said 
2 
Affidavits, to be reasonable for services rendered to Plaintiffs 
since the time of trial shall be reflected in a Supplemental 
Judgment which shall be entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against < 
Defendants for the amount thereof. 
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HAROLD SEVY AND WINONA SEVY, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
vs. 




Civil No. 3375 
This natter cane on regularly for trial before the Honorable 
Don V. Tibbs, Judge of the above-entitled Court, sitting without a 
jury, on the 8th day of July, 1991, at the Garfield County 
Courthouse in Panguitch, Utah. Plaintiffs were present in court 
and represented by their attorney, Robert F. Orton of the firm of 
Marsden, Orton, Cahoon & Gottfredson. Defendant appeared through 
its president, Dan A. Robison, and was represented by its 
attorney, J. Brian Jackson. And the Plaintiffs, having called 
witnesses to testify on their behalf, having offered exhibits and 
having rested; and the Defendant, having called witnesses to 
testify on its behalf, having offered exhibits and having rested; 
and the Court, having heard argument of counsel and having 
thereafter made limited Findings of Fact from the bench; and the 
























executed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav and said Findings 
1
 i| of Fact and Conclusions of Law having been entered herein on the 
30th day of September, 1991; and the Court having executed 
Judgment on the 18th day of October, 1991, and Judgment having 
been entered on the 23rd of October, 1991; and Plaintiffs, 
pursuant to the provisions of said Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and said Judgnent, having filed and served 
Affidavit of Robert F. Orton in Support of Post Trial Attorney's 
Fees and having further filed and served their Memorandum of Costs 
and Necessary Disburseaents; and the tine for Defendant to file 
an affidavit in opposition to post trial attorney's fees, under 
the terns of said Findings and Judgnent, have expired; and the 
time in which to file a notion to tax costs under the rules having 
expired; and the Court being fully advised in the prenises and 
good cause appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
that Plaintiffs, Harold Sevy and Winona Sevy, be and they are 
hereby awarded Supplemental Judgnent in their favor and against 
Defendant, Security Title Company of Southern Utah in the sun and 
amount of THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETY DOLLARS ($3,590.00) 
as and for post trial attorney's fees, together with their costs 
and necessary disbursements herein in the anount of ONE THOUSAND 
THREE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE AND 40/100 DOLLARS ($1,345.40). This 
Supplemental Judgnent shall carry interest at the rate of twelve 



























DATED t h i s jZ^Tlgyof-MQyeaber, 1991 
mi 




STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
EMILY ORTON, being duly sworn, says that she is 
employed in the law firm of MARSDEH, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFRBDSON, 
attorneys for Plaintiff herein; that she served the attached 
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT upon the party listed below by placing a 
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to the 
following and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage 
prepaid, on the ^itL day of November, 1991. 
J. Bryan Jackson, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
ill North Main 
P.O. Box 519 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
fn*iL OsltoYI 
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it seems to me this is quite a clear cut, straightforward 
matter of confession, admissions that were completely 
voluntary from all the testimony that was given. There 
has been no evidence they were involuntary in any 
way as actual voluntariness or legal voluntariness." 
The prosecutor further argued, "Your Honor, I 
believe the cases are entirely in support of the State's 
position, this was a voluntary statement by the 
defendant. . . . It is entirely legal and voluntary as 
well." Although the court failed to specifically rule on 
the issue, it did so implicitly by denying VillarreaTs 
motion to suppress. 
11. Villarreal also contends that his confession should 
have been suppressed because the State failed to 
contemporaneously create a record of his confession. 
Although we do not endorse the particular manner in 
which Villarreal's confession was recorded, see Suae 
v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 891 (Utah 1989), there is no 
basis, in light of the totality of circumstances 
surrounding the confession, for suppression of the 
confession merely because it was not 
contemporaneously recorded. 
CiteM 
218 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 
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[LLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
Appellant, Security Title Company, appeals 
om a judgment determining it was negligent in 
osing a real estate transaction for Appellees, 
irold and Winona Sevy. We reverse as we 
nclude the Sevys' claim is time-barred. 
FACTS 
On April 28, 1981, Harold and Winona Sevy 
Id Kyle and Cindy Stewart 12.86 acres of 
irrigated farm land, located in Garfield County, 
Utah, along with 39 shares of water stock in the 
Long Canal Company, which furnished 
irrigation water to the land. Mr. Sevy is a 
farmer and long time officer of the Long Canal 
Company. The purchase price for the land and 
water stock was $25,000, with a down payment 
of $5000 and annual installments on the unpaid 
balance. 
The Sevys and the Stewarts requested that 
Russell Dalton, the office manager of Security 
Title Company of Southern Utah, prepare 
documents to protect their respective interests in 
the transaction. The parties told Dalton they 
wanted to transfer the title to the land and the 
water stock to the Stewarts, with the Sevys 
retaining a hen against the land and the water 
stock to secure payment of the balance of the 
purchase price. Security Title prepared all of the 
documents,1 recorded the warranty deed and 
deed of trust with assignment of rents, 
transferred the water stock, and issued a title 
insurance policy to the Stewarts. Mr. Sevy paid 
Security Title a $75 escrow fee and a $135 title 
insurance premium on the title insurance policy 
issued to the Stewarts. 
At the closing, Dalton requested that Mr. Sevy 
deliver his water stock certificate representing 
112 shares of the Long Canal Company to 
Security Title. In Dalton's presence, Mr. Sevy 
endorsed the certificate and appointed Security 
Title as agent to transfer 39 of the 112 shares to 
the Stewarts on the books of the Long Canal 
Company. The Long Canal Company then 
issued a new certificate representing 39 shares 
of stock in the Stewarts' name, and sent the 
certificate to Security Title. The company also 
sent a separate certificate for the remaining 73 
shares in Mr. Sevy's name to Security Title. 
Security Title sent this 73 share certificate to 
Mr. Sevy soon after the closing. 
At the trial on July 8, 1991, the testimony was 
in conflict as to the delivery of the 39 share 
water stock certificate, undoubtedly because of 
the ten years which had passed since the 1981 
closing. Mr. Stewart testified that Mr. Sevy 
gave him the closing documents and the 39 
share certificate. Mrs. Stewart testified she 
received the certificate from her husband shortly 
after the closing and that he told her he received 
it from Mr. Sevy. However, Mr. Sevy denied 
delivering the certificate to the Stewarts. Dalton 
testified he had no recollection regarding the 
delivery of the certificate or anything else about 
the transaction. Based upon this testimony, the 
trial court found that Security Title delivered the 
39 share certificate to the Stewarts. 
On August 21, 1985, the Stewarts borrowed 
money from the Lockhart Company, pledging 
the 39 shares of water stock as collateral. The 
Lockhart Company perfected its security interest 
by taking possession of the 39 share certificate 
and through filing a financing statement with the 
Utah State Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code on September 3, 1985. On 
October 2, 1986, the Lockhart Company 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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assigned Associates Financial Services of Utah, 
Inc. all of its rights against the Stewarts and 
delivered to Associates Financial the 39 share 
water stock certificate. 
In 1986, the Stewarts defaulted on their 
payments to the Sevys and the Sevys repossessed 
the farm land. Thereafter, the Stewarts filed a 
petition in bankruptcy. 
Associates Financial filed suit against the 
Sevys and Security Title, to establish the priority 
of its security interest in the 39 shares of water 
stock on April 15,1987. The Sevys defended on 
the merits. On November 2, 1987, summary 
judgment was entered in favor of Associates 
Financial. On August 31, 1989, the Sevys 
repurchased the 39 shares of water stock from 
Associates Financial for $7250. 
The Sevys filed the lawsuit from which this 
appeal arises against Security Title on December 
27, 1989. They alleged Security Title was 
negligent in not protecting their security interest 
in the water stock. Security Title moved for 
summary judgment on the ground that the 
Sevys' claim was barred under the applicable 
statute of limitations. The trial court denied the 
motion. 
On September 26, 1991, after a bench trial, 
the court found Security Title was negligent. 
The trial court determined the custom and 
practice in the title industry, in a sale involving 
water stock in an irrigation company where a 
seller wishes to retain a security interest, 
required an escrow agent to either: (1) delay 
transferring the stock on the books of the 
corporation until the final payment on the 
purchase price is made to the seller, (2) make 
the transfer on the books of the corporation and 
hold the new certificate in escrow until the final 
payment is made, (3) transfer the stock on the 
books of the corporation and deliver the new 
certificate to the seller with instructions that the 
seller retain possession of the certificate until 
final payment is made, or (4) advise the seller to 
seek legal counsel. The trial court determined 
that Security Title breached its duty to the Sevys 
by failing to take any one of these steps.. 
Furthermore, the court awarded the Sevys 
attorney fees and costs incurred in defending the 
Associates Financial action and the amount spent 
by the Sevys in repurchasing the water stock 
from Associates Financial. In addition, the court 
found Security Title's defense of this action was 
without merit and was not asserted in good faith 
and thus awarded attorney fees. As an 
alternative ground for the award of attorney fees 
in this case, the court also found Security Title's 
representation to the Sevys that it was qualified 
to prepare the documents and orchestrate the 
transaction was deceptive under the Utah 
Consumer Protection Act. 
On appeal, Security Title argues: (1) The 
Sevys' claim is time-barred under the statute of 
limitations; (2) The trial court's finding that 
Security Title delivered the stock certificate to 
the Stewarts was clearly erroneous; (3) The trial 
court erred in awarding the Sevys damages when 
there was no foreclosure completed on the 
property secured under the deed of trust; (4) 
The trial court erred by awarding as damages 
the attorney fees and costs the Sevys incurred in 
the action filed against them by Associates 
Financial; and (5) The trial court erred in 
awarding the Sevys attorney fees and costs 
incurred in this action. Additionally, Security 
Title seeks its costs incurred below and on this 
appeal. We do not reach many of the issues 
raised on appeal because we conclude the Sevys' 
action against Security Title is time-barred. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Security Title argues the trial court erred as a 
matter of law in concluding the Sevys' claim 
was not barred by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) 
(1992), the four year negligence statute of 
limitations. The Sevys respond that the trial 
court correctly applied the discovery rule to toll 
the statute of limitations.2 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that 
statutes of limitations " "are designed to promote 
justice by preventing surprises through the 
revival of claims that have been allowed to 
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories 
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.'" 
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 
1981) (quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers 
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 
348-49, 64 S. Ct. 582, 586 (1944)). In 
furtherance of that policy, the general rule is "a 
cause of action accrues and the relevant statute 
of limitations begins to run "upon the happening 
of the last event necessary to complete the cause 
of action . . . [and] mere ignorance of the 
existence of a cause of action does not prevent 
the running of the statute of limitations.'" 
Warren v. Provo Gty Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 
1128-29 (Utah 1992) (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d 
at 86); see also O'Neal v. Division of Family 
Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Utah 1991). 
Under the general rule, the statute of 
limitations ran on the Sevys' claim several years 
before this action was filed. However, the trial 
court concluded the discovery rule saved the 
Sevys' claim. 
Whether the discovery rule applies to toll the 
statute of limitations is a question of law, thus 
we "show no deference to the trial court's ruling 
on appeal, but we review it for correctness." 
Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 
1990). 
The Utah Supreme Court has identified 
three circumstances where the discovery 
rule applies: (1) in situations where the 
discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in 
situations where a plaintiff does not become 
aware of the cause of action because of the 
defendant's concealment or misleading 
conduct; and (3) in situations where the case 
presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be 
irrational or unjust, regardless of any 
showing that the defendant has prevented the 
discovery of the cause of action. 
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Warrai, 838 P.2d at 1129 (footnotes omitted); 
accord Klinger, 791 P.2d at 872; Myers, 635 
P.2d at 86. 
There is no Utah statute mandating application 
of the discovery rule in a negligence action 
against a title company. Furthermore, the Sevys 
have not asserted, nor did the trial court find, 
that Security Title misled the Sevys regarding 
their cause of action against Security Title. 
Thus, it is the third instance, the judicially 
created equitable "exceptional circumstances" 
rule which we analyze on appeal. 
A. Discovery Requirement 
The Utah Supreme Court explained in Warren 
v. Provo Gty Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 
1992), that to qualify under the exceptional 
circumstances exception, the plaintiff must make 
an "initial showing" that "the plaintiff did not 
know of and could not reasonably have known 
of the existence of the cause of action in time to 
file a claim within the limitation period." Id. at 
1129. This is a threshold requirement.3 O'Neal 
v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 
1144 (Utah 1992). In Warren, the plaintiff was 
a pilot who had been injured in a crash of an 
airplane he had leased from a flying club. After 
the crash, the plaintiff brought an action against 
the city for the city's failure to enforce an 
ordinance regulating flying clubs. The ordinance 
required flying clubs to assure that their 
airplanes were airworthy, to maintain insurance, 
and to file a certificate of insurance at the 
airport. The city argued the plaintiffs claim was 
time-barred because it was filed after the 
applicable statute of limitations had run. The 
plaintiff argued the discovery rule should be 
applied to his claim because he did not have 
reasonable grounds to believe the city was not 
enforcing its ordinances until after the statute of 
limitations had run. The court determined the 
plaintiffs claim did not qualify under the 
exceptional circumstances exception because the 
fact that the plane crashed gave the plaintiff 
reason to question whether Provo city was 
enforcing its ordinance requiring the flying club 
to keep its airplanes in an airworthy condition. 
The court further concluded that since the 
plaintiffs counsel had contacted the airport 
within the statutory period about the ordinance 
that he knew or should have known of its 
requirements. Id. at 1129. 
Therefore, for the Sevys to benefit from the 
discovery rule, and not have their claim barred 
by the four-year statute of limitations, the trial 
court had to find the Sevys neither knew of 
Security Title's failure to protect their security 
interest in the water shares, nor should have 
reasonably known of this failure until four years 
before they filed their lawsuit. 
In its written findings of fact the trial court 
stated: 
10. Both Sevy and Stewart believed that 
Sevy was transferring to Stewart said land 
and 39 shares of water stock at the time of 
the transaction and Sevy believed that he 







had a good and valid first lien against said 
land and 39 shares of water stock 
transferred to Stewart to secure payment of 
the balance of the purchase price. 
17. Members of the general public rely 
generally on title [agents] to properly 
prepare documents and conduct real estate 
transactions and closings and further rely on 
what they are told by title companies with 
respect to real estate transactions. 
19. Sevy relied on Security Title to protect 
him by providing in said transaction a good 
and valid first lien in his favor against the 
real property and shares of water stock 
being sold and transferred to Stewart. 
22. Plaintiff, Harold Sevy, is a farmer, does 
not have a formal education, and relied on 
Security Title to prepare proper documents 
and secure his first hen against the real 
property and water stock. Said Plaintiff had, 
prior to said transaction, been an officer in 
The Long Canal Company, but had no 
knowledge regarding how to transfer shares 
and how to perfect security interests therein. 
23. Plaintiff, Winona Sevy, did nothing 
more in this transaction than sign documents 
as requested by her husband, Harold Sevy. 
25. The first knowledge Sevy had that 
Stewart had given a lien against said 
certificate numbered 206 [representing the 
39 shares of water stock] in favor of a 
lending institution was when Sevy was sued 
by Associates [Financial], as aforesaid. 
The court supplements this with an oral finding 
on discovery: 
1 find against the Defendant on the Statute 
of Limitation. . . . The Court makes a 
finding that the Statute of Limitations would 
commence as of the time of the discovery, 
which was the filing of the [Associates 
Financial] lawsuit. 
We agree with Security Title that the findings 
are not crystal clear as to when the Sevys 
reasonably should have known of Security 
Title's failure to protect their security interest. 
However, we hold that even if the trial court can 
be credited with finding that the Sevys could not 
have reasonably known Security Title did not 
protect their security interest in the 39 shares 
until they were put on notice of the Associates 
Financial lawsuit, the court's finding is clearly 
erroneous. 
Mr. Sevy knew the water stock had been 
transferred to the Stewarts' name, as he 
cooperated in the transfer. In addition, Mr. Sevy 
knew or should have known there was no 
ongoing escrow at Security Title because there 
was no document reflecting any ongoing escrow 
given to him at closing. Furthermore, the Sevys 
received the 73 share certificate in their name 
soon after the closing. Mr. Sevy testified that he 
knew he did not receive the certificate 
representing the 39 shares of w 
had been transferred into the 
Nothing prevented the Sev; 
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representing the 39 shares of water stock, which 
had been transferred into the Stewarts' name. 
Nothing prevented the Sevys from asking 
Security Title about the 39 share water stock 
certificate and how Security Title was protecting 
their interest in those water shares. In addition, 
as an officer of the Long Canal Company for 
more than forty years, Mr. Sevy knew the water 
stock certificate was valuable and transferable. 
In fact, Mr. Sevy kept his own water stock 
certificate in a safe deposit box. Based upon 
these facts we think the Sevys could and should 
have discovered that Security Title had failed to 
protect their security interest in the 39 shares of 
water stock long before the Associates Financial 
lawsuit was filed and at a time which results in 
their action being time-barred. 
B. Balancing Test 
The court in Warren v. Provo Oty Corp., 838 
P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992) explained that if the 
plaintiff meets the threshold discovery test, then 
the reviewing court moves to the balancing test, 
which is what "(t]he ultimate determination of 
whether a case presents exceptional 
circumstances that render the application of a 
statute of limitations irrational or unjust turns 
on." Id. at 1129. As noted in Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981), in 
applying the balancing test a court will balance 
the hardship the statute of limitations would 
impose on the plaintiff against any prejudice to 
the defendant resulting from difficulties of proof 
caused by the passage of time. Id. at 87; see 
also Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 872 
(Utah 1990). 
Although we need not reach this prong of the 
discovery rule because the Sevys have failed to 
meet the threshold reasonable discovery 
requirement, we note that the application of the 
discovery rule would create significant problems 
of proof for Security Title. Security Title's key 
witness Russell Dalton, who prepared all of the 
documents in the transaction, had no memory of 
the critical facts. Dalton testified at trial he did 
not have any specific recollection of the sales 
transaction. He could not remember if he gave 
the water certificate to Mr. Stewart, whether he 
advised Mr. Sevy to get an attorney, whether he 
advised Mr. Sevy to put the documents in a safe 
place, or whether he advised Mr. Sevy not to 
turn the water stock over to the Stewarts prior to 
the promissory note being paid off. 
Furthermore, the Stewarts testified their file on 
the transaction was lost and they could not 
remember many of the details of the transaction. 
Were we to reach a balancing of the equities, 
we would conclude this is not the exceptional 
case where the statute of limitations should be 
tolled to allow a stale, ten-year old claim to be 
litigated. We cannot say it would be irrational or 
unjust to bar the Sevys' claim. The crucial 
witness for Security Title had no recollection of 
the transaction, which, in effect, denied Security 
Title the opportunity to refute the self-interested 
testimony of Mr. Sevy on critical factors. This 
37 
would be true in most title transactions that 
occurred ten years earlier. 
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Because of our resolution of the statute of 
limitations issue, we also vacate the award of 
damages to the Sevys, including the Associates 
Financial attorney fees awarded as consequential 
damages. We also vacate the award of attorney 
fees to the Sevys for this action because there is 
no legal basis for the award. The trial court 
awarded attorney fees to the Sevys in this action 
based on two statutory provisions. First, the 
court concluded Security Title's actions were 
deceptive under the Utah Consumer Sales 
Practices Act (UCSPA). See Utah Code Ann. 
§13-11-1 to -20 (1989 & Supp. 1992). Second, 
the court concluded attorney fees were 
recoverable under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 
(1992) because Security Title's defense was 
asserted without merit and not in good faith. 
The UCSPA provides no basis upon which to 
award the Sevys attorney fees in this action. The 
Sevys failed to plead a cause of action under the 
UCSPA, and certainly did not prove one. 
Additionally, Security Title's defense certainly 
was not without merit under §78-27-56 as we 
have ruled in its favor on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude the Sevys have not met the 
threshold requirement to toll the statute of 
limitations under the "exceptional 
circumstances" discovery rule. The Sevys could 
and should have reasonably discovered that 
Security Title had failed to protect their security 
interest before 1987 and thus their action is 
time-barred. We therefore vacate the award of 
damages and attorney ftes to the Sevys. We also 
award costs to Security Title. 
Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Security Title prepared: (1) a warranty deed 
conveying the land from the Sevys to the Stewarts, (2) 
a note secured by a deed of trust in the principal 
amount of $20,000 from the Stewarts to the Sevys, (3) 
a deed of trust with assignment of rents against the 
land and water stock from the Stewarts to the Sevys, 
and (4) an owners title insurance policy for the 
Stewarts for $25,000, the full amount of the purchase 
price, which did not include the water stock but only 
covered the land. 
2. The Sevys, in the section of their brief addressing 
their discovery rule argument, in two sentences 
followed by a less than supportive citation, also assert 
their claim is not time-barred because they were not 
damaged until 1987 when they could not foreclose 
their security interest. We refuse to consider this issue 
on appeal as it was inadequately addressed. See State 
v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992). 
3. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held the 
plaintiff must meet this threshold test before the 
discovery rule will be applied. See Atwood v. Sturm, 
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Ruger <t Co., 823 P.2d 1064, 1065 (Utah 1992) 
(ruling plaintiffs products liability claim against 
manufacturer of plaintiffs pistol was time-barred 
because statute of limitations began to run on date of 
injury even though plaintiff did not learn the injury 
may have been caused by a product defect until 
several months before the statute of limitations 
expired); Allen v. Ortez\ 802 P.2d 1307, 1313-14 
(Utah 1990) (applying discovery rule to libel action 
because court held plaintiffs did not know, and could 
not reasonably have known, of underlying facts giving 
rise to their cause of action); Brigham Young Univ. v. 
Paulsen Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 
1987) (stating discovery rule did not apply because 
plaintiff knew of leakage and improper pipe 
insulation, which gave rise to its cause of action, three 
and a half years before the statute of limitations period 
expired); Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196, 
1199 (Utah 1987) (declining to apply discovery rule in 
personal injury action because conditions which 
caused injury were patent); Christiansen v. Reest 436 
P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1968) (holding discovery rule 
applied to medical malpracticeaction becauseplaintiff, 
in exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have 
discovered presence of foreign object in his body 
before statute of limitations ran). 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Jacqui C. Walls appeals a final order of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah denying her 
workers' compensation benefits under Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1988). We affirm. 
FACTS 
On December 29, 1989, Walls was employed 
as a bartender at Uncle Baits, an Ogden bar. 
Following her daytime shift, which ended at 
5:00, she remained at the bar to socialize, shoot 
pool and drink beer. Sometime between 10:30 
p.m. and 11:00 p.m., approximately six hours 
after her shift had ended, Walls became aware 
that a keg of beer was empty. Without being 
asked to do so, Walls went into the back room 
to prepare another keg to be tapped. As she 
opened the door to the refrigerator where the 
kegs were stored, a keg slid out and crushed her 
foot. 
Seeking compensation for her sustained 
injuries, Walls filed an application for a hearing 
before an administrative law judge (AD) of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah on March 27, 
1990. Following the hearing, the ALJ denied 
Walls's claim, holding that her injury did not 
"arise out of and in the course o r her 
employment, as to meet the requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1988). Wails 
thereafter filed a request for review by the 
Industrial Commission, which request was 
denied. 
The sole issue presented for review is whether 
the Industrial Commission properly denied Walls 
workers' compensation benefits pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1988). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA) applies to all proceedings commenced 
on or after January 1, 1988. Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-22(2) (1989). Thus, we review Walls's 
appeal under post-UAPA law. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4) (1989) 
provides: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only 
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted 
or applied the law . . . . 
As to the application of this section, we have 
stated: 
With the adoption of UAPA, deference to 
an agency's statutory construction should be 
given only "when there is a grant of 
discretion to the agency concerning the 
language in question, either expressly made 
in the statute or implied from the statutory 
language/ Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of 
the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 
589 (Utah 1991). Where there exists a grant 
of discretion, "we will not disturb the 
Board's application of its factual findings to 
the law unless its determination exceeds the 
bounds of reasonableness and rationality.M 
Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 
P.2d 439,442 (Utah App. 1989). "lAJbsent 
a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error 
standard is used in reviewing an agency's 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES 
COMPANY OF UTAH, INC. , a 
Utah Corporation, 
P la int i f f , 
vs. 
HAROLD SEVY; WINONA R. SEVY: 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OF 
SOUTHERN UTAH, a Utah 
Corporation, as Trustee; and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 87-146 
The above-entitled matter was submitted to the Court without 
oral argument under Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice in the 
District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah for 
ruling on Plaintiff's "Motion for Summary Judgment" dated May 29, 
1987, and for ruling on the "Motion to Dismiss" of Defendants 
SEVY, dated June 9, 1987. The Court reviewed the files and 
records of the case insofar as they related to said motions, 
including Plaintiff's "Verified Complaint", the "Affidavit of 
Harold Sevy in Support of Motion of Defendants, Sevy, for Change 
of Venue", the "Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion of Defendants Sevy, for Change of Venue", the "Memorandum 
Opposing Defendants' Motion for Change of Venue and Supporting 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment", the "Order Overruling 
and Denying Motion for Change of Venue", the Counter-Affidavit of 
Defendant, Harold Sevy", the "Affidavit of Gerald W. Stoker, 
P. E. ", the "Affidavit of James P. Yardley", the Supplementary 
Memorandum Supporting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Opposing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss", the "Statement of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Motion of Defendants, Sevy, to 
Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment", the "Affidavit of Clark Dennett", the "Affidavit of 
Lynda Hollerman", the Supplementary Memorandum Supporting 
Defendant Sevy's (sic) Motion to Dismiss and Opposing Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment", and Plaintiff's Reply to 
Supplementary Memorandum Supporting Defendant Sevy's (sic) Motion 
to Dismiss and Opposing Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment". 
The Court noted from the file that Defendant SECURITY TITLE 
COMPANY OF SOUTHERN UTAH, a Utah corporation, as Trustee, was 
duly served with process within the State of Utah on April 16, 
1987, and thereafter failed to appear and answer or otherwise 
defend within the time required by law. The Court having made 
and entered its Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law, good 
cause appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
as follows: 
1. That the default of Defendant SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OF 
UTAH, a Utah corporation, as Trustee, should be and it hereby is, 
entered. 
2. That Plaintiff should be and hereby is, awarded default 
judgment against Defendant SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OP SOUTHERN 
UTAH, a Utah corporation, as Trustee. 
3. That summary judgment should be and hereby is, entered 
against Defendants HAROLD SEVY and WINONA P. SEVY, in favor of 
Plaintiff ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPANY OF UTAH, INC., a 
Utah corporation. 
4. That Plaintiff is the holder of a good, valid and 
sufficient, perfected security interest in and to share 
certificate 206, covering 39 shares of the capital stock in The 
Long Canal Company, free and clear of any adverse right, title, 
claim, lien or security interest on the part of Defendants SEVY 
and/or SECURITY TITLE COMPANY. 
5. That Plaintiff may foreclose its security interest in 
The Long Canal Company share certificate 206 as provided by law, 
without further claim or interference by Defendants. 
6. Defendants SEVY and SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, and any 
claiming by, through or under them, should be and hereby are, 
permanently enjoined and restrained from asserting any claim to 
The Long Canal Company share certificate 206 and the water rights 
represented thereby in derogation of or adverse to Plaintiff's 
perfected security interest in the same, and from any 




7. That Plaintiff should be and hereby is, awarded its 
costs of Court upon filing of an appropriate memorandum of costs 
and disbursements. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of ^?t&v^t^e^^, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ > Ce^C4-
3/ PHILIP EVEjB, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the %& day of A/fll'SfrlflEg. , 1987, 
I mailed a full, true and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing SUMMARY AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT, to Mr. Robert F. Orton, 
Esq., of Marsden, Orton & Cahoon, Attorneys at Law, at 68 South 
Main, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, by first-class 
mail, postage fully prepaid. 
-f^m MftMnvJenyi J 
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1 Dean E. Conder, Senior District Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3-24(1)0) (1987). 
1. Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and 
livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1047 (Utah 1985) 
(citation omitted) seet Garff Realty Co. v. Better 
Buildings, Inc., 120 Utah 344, 234 P.2d 842, 844 
(1951). 
3. The requirement that the event occur after for-
mation of the contract distinguishes a case of supe-
rvening impossibility, such as this, from a case in 
which the contract cannot be performed because of 
a mistake, an unknown legal requirement, or other 
fact in existence at the time the contract is made. See 
Quaghana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 
P.2d 301, 305-08 (Utah 1975); Sine v. Rudy, 27 
Utah 2d 67, 493 P.2d 299 (1972); Mooney v. GR 
and Assoc., 746 P.2d 1174,1176 (Utah App. 1987). 
4. See Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582 
P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1978) ("[A] party may be reli-
eved of performing an obligation under a contract 
where supervening events, unforeseeable at the time 
the contract is made, render performance of the 
contract impossible"; the defense did not prevail 
because evidence was insufficient); Transatlantic 
Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
section 261; J. Calimari & J. Perillo, Contracts, 476 
et seq. (2d ed. 1977); Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-
615(a) (1980) establishes the impossibility defense in 
contracts for the sale of goods. 
5. We recognize that the City's failure to approve 
seems, from our present perspective, to be rather 
easy to foresee. However, the critical fact is not 
whether the event could have been foreseen, but 
rather, whether the parties actually did foresee it 
and provide accordingly in their contract. A dictum 
in one Utah case on impossibility employs the word 
"unforeseeable" in describing the event causing 
impossibility, Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 
582 P.2d at 61 (Utah 1978); however, the better and 
more widely accepted rule looks not to whether the 
parties could or should have foreseen the event, but 
rather whether, as a fact of assent, they did foresee 
it. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §261 & 
comment b (1981). 
6. The trial court made no finding expressly deter-
mining when performance became impossible; 
however, since the parties do not contest the matter 
of timing, we presume the trial court's decision to 
be correct in this regard. We therefore do not con-
sider whether the award of rent for the period pre-
ceding abandonment was erroneous, because the 
cross-appeal of that award is based solely on the 
argument that Nichols erred in executing the lease, 
an argument which we rejected above. 
7. See, Castagno v. Church, 552 P.2d 1282 (Utah 
1976); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §265 
(1981); J. Calimari & J. Perillo, Contracts, 495-96 
(2d ed. 1977). 
8. We distinguish Jespersen v. Deseret News Publi-
shing Co., 119 Utah 235, 225 P.2d 1050 (1951) and 
General Ins. Co. of America v. Christiansen Furni-
ture Co., 119 Utah 470, 229 P.2d 298 (1951) because 
they are based on an argument not raised below or 
in this court. At common law, the application of the 
usual contract defenses to a covenant to pay rent 
was limited. We do not reach the question whether 
this rule could apply in this case, because it has not 
been argued. 
Cite as 
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The Defendants Harold and Winona Sevy 
appeal from a judgment of the district court 
permitting Associates Financial Services 
Company of Utah ("Associates") to foreclose 
their interest in certain irrigation company 
stock. We affirm. 
In 1981, the Sevys sold about thirteen acres 
of land in Garfield County to Kyle and Cindy 
Stewart, along with 39 shares of the Long 
Canal Company, which for many years had 
furnished irrigation water to the land.2 To 
secure payment of the purchase price, the 
Sevys were beneficiaries of a trust deed cove-
ring both the land and the irrigation company 
stock. The trust deed was duly recorded. The 
Long Canal Company issued a stock certifi-
cate for the 39 shares in the names of the 
Stewarts, and this stock certificate remained in 
the Stewarts' possession. 
In 1985, the Stewarts obtained a loan from 
the Lockhart Company, pledging the canal 
company stock as collateral. The Lockhart 
Company took possession of the stock certif-
icate and filed a financing statement covering 
the stock. A year later, the Stewarts refina-
nced their loan and borrowed from Lockhart 
additional funds secured by the same collat-
eral, bringing the total principal debt to 
$ 12,213 at 16.597o interest. Lockhart thereafter 
assigned the loan and security interest, and 
transferred possession of the stock certificate, 
to Associates. 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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Stewarts filed a petition in bankruptcy, and 
the trustee abandoned the irrigation company 
stock. Associates thereupon sued to establish 
the priority of its security interest in the stock. 
The trial court concluded that the stock was 
appurtenant to the land and that the Sevys' 
security interest would thus have priority 
superior to that of Associates, but that the 
Sevys were estopped from asserting the prio-
rity of their security interest because they 
permitted the Stewarts to retain possession of 
the stock certificate. Judgment was accordi-
ngly entered on November 4, 1987* permitting 
Associates to foreclose the Sevys* security 
interest. 
The Sevys filed notice of appeal designating 
the Court of Appeals as the appellate court. 
The Iron County Clerk treated the appeal as 
to the Supreme Court, and further filings and 
motions prior to briefing were made in the 
Supreme Court. The case was eventually tra-
nsferred by the Supreme Court to this Court. 
Associates asserts a lack of appellate juris-
diction based on the fact that the notice of 
appeal indicates that the appeal is taken to the 
Court of Appeals. Appellate jurisdiction in 
this type of case is properly in the Supreme 
Court,4 and therefore, the Sevys' notice of 
appeal was incorrect in stating that the appeal 
was taken to the Court of Appeals. However, 
the rules of both Courts recognize that such 
an error is inconsequential.5 Moreover, the 
error caused no real harm in this case, because 
all filings and proceedings on appeal were 
before the Supreme Court until the case was 
transferred here, despite the error on the 
notice of appeal. Since the purpose of the 
notice of appeal is fundamentally to give 
notice that an appeal has been taken,* and 
since no party or court seems to have been 
misinformed by the error, we find that the 
notice of appeal is sufficient to establish 
appellate jurisdiction, despite the error in 
specifying the appropriate appellate court. 
We turn to the question of the relative pri-
orities of the parties' security interests7 in the 
irrigation company stock, a question of first 
impression. The trial court based its decision 
that the Sevys had superior priority on a line 
of cases interpreting Utah Code Ann. §73-1-
10 (1980), which states that water rights 
"represented by shares of stock in a corpora-
tion .... shall not be deemed to be appurtenant 
to the land ...." Those words have been held 
to create a mere presumption that irrigation 
company stock is not transferred with a con-
veyance of the land to which the stock has 
provided water, and the presumption is rebu-
ttable by clear and convincing evidence.9 All 
of these cases involved a conveyance of full 
title rather than creation or priority of a sec-
urity interest, the issue being whether the irr-
igation stock was included in a conveyance of 
the land on which the water was used. 
Applying the case law just described to 
CODE*CO 
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establish superior priority in the Sevys would 
be at variance with the priority structure pre-
scribed by Article 9 of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code. Priority under Utah Code 
Ann. §70A-9-312(5) (1980) is determined 
generally according to the date on which the 
security interest is perfected. For an 
"instrument" such as a certificated security, 
perfection is accomplished by possession of 
the certificate evidencing the security, except 
for a 21-day period of automatic perfection 
immediately after attachment of the security 
interest.9 The Sevys did not take possession of 
the irrigation company stock certificate, and 
thus did not perfect their security interest in 
the irrigation company stock. Therefore, 
under Article 9, their priority is inferior to 
that of Associates, whose predecessor took 
possession of the certificate and transferred 
possession of it to Associates. 
For Article 9 to apply, the irrigation 
company stock must fall within the definition 
of an "instrument," which is defined in Utah 
Code Ann. §70A-9-105(1)0) as including a 
"security." "Security" is in turn defined in 
§70A-8-102(l)(a), which provides: 
(a) A "security" is an instrument 
which (i) is issued in bearer or reg-
istered form; and (ii) is of a type 
commonly dealt in upon securities 
exchanges or markets or commonly 
recognized in any area in which it is 
issued or dealt in as a medium for 
investment; and (iii) is either one of 
a class or a series or by its terms is 
divisible into a class or series of 
instruments; and (iv) evidences a 
share, participation or other interest 
in property or in an enterprise or 
evidences an obligation of the 
issuer. 
The stock here in question appears to be 
issued in registered form as some of a series or 
classes of corporate stock, and the stock cer-
tificate evidences a share in the irrigation 
enterprise of the Long Canal Company. The 
Sevys assert, however, that the stock is not "of 
a type commonly dealt in upon securities 
exchanges or markets or commonly recognized 
in [Utah] as a medium for investment." We 
are nevertheless of the opinion that irrigation 
company stock is a "medium of investment." 
It may be true that there is no established 
stock exchange or institutionalized market for 
trading in irrigation company stock in Utah. 
However, the stock of an irrigation company 
ordinarily embodies its capital, provides a 
return to its owners in the form of water use, 
and was the means by which it amassed the 
resources to obtain its water rights and build 
its water transport and distribution system. It 
is accordingly a medium of investment. 
In holding that Article 9 establishes the 
superior priority of Associates' security inte-
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rest, we distinguish the line of cases holding 
that stock in an irrigation company may be 
appurtenant to, and impliedly conveyed with, 
an interest in real property. The rule of those 
cases does not apply to the creation and per-
fection of security interests in irrigation 
company stock. This conclusion is grounded in 
the rule that a later statute supersedes an 
earlier statute if the two are in conflict,10 
inasmuch as the Uniform Commercial Code, 
enacted in 1965 in Utah, followed in time 
section 73-1-10 of Utah Code Ann., which 
was last amended in 1959. Moreover, in view 
of the importance of uniformity and predict-
ability in commercial law," we favor a result 
which will not have the effect of creating an 
exception to the Article 9 priority structure for 
something which has the appearance of fitting 
rather clearly within that structure. We also 
note, as the trial court did, that it is equitable, 
as between Sevys and Associates, that the loss 
resulting from the double collateralization fall 
upon the Sevys, who, albeit unwittingly, left 
the Stewarts in the position to again borrow 
on the stock. 
We therefore hold that the security interest 
of Associates in the irrigation company stock 
is prior to the unperfected security interest of 
the Sevys, and that Associates may foreclose 
the Sevys' security interest in accordance with 
Article 9 of the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code. The order of the district court is ther-
efore affirmed.12 
Dean £. Conder, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. Dean £ . Conder, Senior District Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3-24(1)0) (1987). 
2. Irrigation companies are a common legal means 
of owning and distributing irrigation water in Utah. 
Many of them began as cooperative enterprises by 
early settlers and eventually took corporate form, 
usually on a not-for-profit basis. The ownership 
of stock in such a company typically gives the sto-
ckholder the right to receive a part of the 
company's water proportionate to the 'amount 
owned. The ownership of stock in the irrigation 
company thus becomes in some respects tantamount 
to ownership of the water rights themselves. 
3. Associates argues that the notice of appeal is 
untimely, based on the fact that the date stamped 
on the judgment as the date of entry was altered. 
There is no claim, however, of unauthorized tamp-
ering with the court records, or even of error in 
showing the date of entry as November 4, 1987. We 
therefore conclude that the notice of appeal was 
timely filed. 
4. Compare Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 with Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1988). 
5. R. Utah Sup. Ct. 4C; R. Utah Ct. App. 4C. 
6. Wood v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 229, 419 P.2d 634, 
635 (1966); Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 
15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964). 
65 
7. The trust deed of which the Sevys were named 
beneficiaries suffices as a security agreement and 
both parties appear to have satisfied the prerequis-
ites of Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-203 (1980) for 
creation and attachment of their security interests in 
the stock. 
8. Roundy v. Coombs, 668 P.2d 550 (Utah 1983); Ab-
bott v. Christcnsen, 660 P.2d 254 (Utah 1983); Hatch 
v. Adams, 7 Utah 2d 73, 318 P.2d 633, aWd 
on reh., 8 Utah 2d 82, 329 P.2d 285 (1958) (decided 
on rehearing on the basis of the parol evidence rule) 
Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking Co., 2 Utah 2d 93, 
269 P.2d 859 (1954). 
9. Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-304(l), (4) (1980); see also 
R. Henson, Handbook on Secured Transa-
ctions 108-110(1973). 
10. Pride Club v. Miller, 572 P.2d 385, 387 (Utah 
1977); see also Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 
757 P.2d 882,884-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
11. See, Utah Code Ann. §70A-1-102(1) (1980) 
and §70A-l-102(2)(c); Butts v. Glendale 
Plywood Co. 710 F.2d 504, 506 (9th Cir. 1983). 
12. Because we hold that Associates' security inte-
rest is prior to that of the Sevys, we do not reach 
the question of estoppel on which the district court 
based its decision, or the question whether the 
material facts concerning estoppel were in dispute so 
as to preclude summary judgment. 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
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